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THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FEUDAL 
MODE OF PRODUCTION 
John Pryor 
In one sense at least the very concept of a Feudal Mode of 
Production is entirely fictive. For Marx the Feudal Mode of 
production was interesting and worthy of study primarily as a 
dialectical antithesis to the consuming passion of his life: the 
Capitalist Mode of Production. Marx himself never anywhere 
attempted a systematic exploration of either the philosophical 
logic or the historical foundations of the Feudal Mode of Production. 
Marxist scholars interested in pre-capitalist modes of production 
writing during the last hundred years or so have attempted to 
elucidate the characteristics of the Feudal Mode of Production 
as sketchily outlined by Marx, but in most cases, at least in the 
European context, the result has been a barren exercise in 
philosophy or epistemology rather than an examination of the 
empirical foundations of a Feudal Mode of Production in historical 
phenomena. The same is true, I believe, of all other pre-capitalist 
or non-capitalist modes of production. The Feudal Mode of 
Production cannot be studied in Marx's works except as the 
antithesis of capitalism. To isolate what he wrote about the Feudal 
Mode of Production from its context within his discussions of 
capitalism is to derive a concept of the former which is barren 
and lifeless. 
Yet in another sense Marx himself quite clearly believed that 
a Feudal Mode of Production had existed as a real historical 
phenomenon in Europe over a long period of time. If he chose 
not to explore it in print in detail, that was because other tasks 
seemed more pressing. We know, however, that he spent a good 
deal of time reading historical works about the Middle Ages, and 
in particular about the economy and society of medieval Europe) 
The Feudal Mode of Production had an importance for him far 
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above that of all other non-capitalist modes of production because 
it was out of the ruins of the Feudal Mode, as its forces of 
production outstripped its social relations of production in the 
later Middle Ages and early modern periods, that capitalism was 
born. If the Feudal Mode of Production had never had concrete 
historical reality, then neither could have capitalism; at least 
as Marx analysed it. 
Marx developed his understanding of the Feudal Mode of 
Production in two ways: by reading in empirical medieval history 
and by logical dialectical antithesis to his analysis of capitalism. 
Here is not the place to elaborate in detail what he understood 
by the Feudal Mode of Production. I have done that elsewhere. 
However, some brief statement of understanding is necessary. 
For Marx the Feudal Mode of Production was a system of 
agricultural and craft production by a non-free labour force 
(although urban craft production by a free labour force later became 
encompassed within it) carried on on large estates which were 
"owned" or effectively possessed by non-labouring landlords 
(although the labour force also had effective hereditary rights 
to sections of the estates) and in which the transfer of surplus 
labour or product of labour was effected not by economic means 
as in capitalism but rather by the exercise of direct political, 
legal, and military force or coercion necessitated by the effective 
property rights of the producing labour force. Such an understanding 
can be defended in Marx's words both by reference ~o the historical 
"facts" which he adduces and also bv reference to the dialectical 
antithesis to capitalism made by him. -
One of the major problems with this concept of a Feudal Mode 
of Production, one which has led many historians to deny that 
it has any historical validity, is Marx's use of the word "feudal" 
to describe it. Marx used it because he inherited an identification 
of the predominant social, economic, and political structures 
of the Middle Ages as "feudalism" or feodalitt, that had been 
made by historians and political scientists since the seventeenth 
century. "Feudalism" was a concept so ingrained in reference 
to the Middle Ages that it was unavoidable. It still is today. Yet 
"feudalism", or feodalitas in the Latin, was never a word used 
in anything like this fashion in the Middle Ages and even feudum 
for a military fief and the adjective f"eodalis pertaining to a military 
fief were phenomena only of the ninth century and later.2 
Moreover, there are not only chronological problems with the 
attribution "feudal" but also semantic problems since many 
historians would deny that the institution of the military fief 
had anything to do with the structure of the medieval economy; 
would, in short, deny that the term "feudal" is in any way an 
accurate characterisation of medieval society. Marx's use of 
the term brought with it a coterie of implicit assumptions which 
clouded and distorted the essential structure of the mode of 
production as he understood it. But if we bear in mind that his 
use of "feudal" was a product of scholarly tradition and really 
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denoted little more than "medieval", it becomes possible to cut 
these assumptions away from the essential structure and in doing 
so to develop a clearer understanding of the historical foundations 
of the Feudal Mode of Production. 
For Marx these foundations lay in a unique synthesis of its 
two predecessors: the Ancient or Slave Mode of Production and 
the Germanic Mode of Production. 
The Germanic barbarians, who lived in isolation on the 
land and for whom agriculture with bondsmen was the 
traditional production, could impose these conditions on 
the Roman provinces all the more easily as the concentration 
of landed property which had taken place there had already 
entirely overthrown earlier agricultural relations.3 
For a synthetic analysis made in the 1870s this was remarkably 
percipient. Alfons Dopsch was not to demonstrate the historical 
foundations of its validity until fifty years later. 4 
From the time of Rome's expansion in the last two centuries 
B.C., her early socio-economic pattern of smallholding peasant 
agriculture was gradually eroded by the large estate. Small peasant 
farming and soldier settlement never disappeared completely 
and, indeed, historians have recently begun to emphasize the extent 
to which they survived even in the later Roman Empire.5 
Nevertheless they were gradually overshadowed by estate 
agriculture. As early as the first century A.D. Pliny the Elder 
complained that latifundia were· destroying Italy, or the Italian 
economy; although his complaint is probably to be seen more as 
wishful thinking for the "good old days" than as a reflection of 
reality.6 But more important than the latifundia were the individual 
fundi, saltus, estates of which they were composed. From the 
end of the first century A.D. a bronze tablet from Velleia, near 
Piacenza, inscribed as part of Trajan's alimenta programme, records 
forty-six properties of an average value of 300,0000 sesterces. 7 
Finley's estimate is that at a modest return of six per cent of 
capital value per annum they were worth about 18,000 sesterces 
per annum or fifteen times the gross pay of a legionary of that 
period. In the mid-fourth century the poet Ausonius gives figures 
of 200 acres of arable, about 100 of vineyard, 50 of pasture, and 
700 of woodland for his "little inheritance" (herediolus) near 
Bordeaux.8 Archaeological evidence from the villae of Roman 
Gaul would support a generalized assertion that estates of medium 
size of some 500 acres of various types of land were not at all 
uncommon amongst the middle rank of Galle-Roman provincial 
families of senatorial rank from the first to the fifth centuries. 
In Africa saltus owned by private landowners were frequently 
as lm·ge as the territor·ies of cities and had large populations 
clustered in vici around the landowner's villa. 9 
Paulinus of Pella, the grandson of Ausonius, in his Eucharisticus 
written in 459 A.D. has left a description of an estate near Bordeaux 
which he acquired around 400 A.D. 
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1 hastened to bring fallowed lands under tillage, and promptly 
to lavish pains in renewing the exhausted vineyards ..• my 
house should be equipped with spacious apartments and 
at all times suited to meet the varying seasons of the year, 
my table lavish and attractive, my servants many and young, 
the furniture abundant and agreeable for various purposes, 
plat~ more preeminent in price than poundage, workmen 
of divers crafts trained promptly to fulfil my behests, and 
my stables filled with well-conditoned beasts and, withal, 
stately carriages to convey me safe abroad.lO 
During the later centuries of the Roman Empire rural landed estates 
more and more became crucial centres of production. Economic 
forces worked hand in hand with traditional Roman mores. As 
early as the third century B.C. Cato the Elder had recommended 
that the paterfamilias of a holding should be a seller not a buyer.ll 
Paulinus of Pella's reference to the craftsmen on his estate 
producing artisan goods is merely one index of a general trend 
towards estate manufacture and away from reliance on urban 
manufacture and the exchange economy which that demanded.l2 
On a typical late Roman saltus if we can postulate such a 
type, the home farm surrounding the central homestead, the villa, 
would be farmed directly by the landlord. Centred on the villa 
in the narrow sense of house and farm buildings belonging to it, 
often surrounded by a ditch or wall in unsettled areas, the home 
farm would consist of the best land. It was the heart of the estate, 
farmed by the landlord's familia, his farm slaves, under the direction 
of an actor or villicus, usually a slave, as overseeing manager 
or administ1·ator. More distant and scattered parts of the property 
would be allocated normally to tenant coloni or slaves quasi coloni 
as small tenures. Living in vici circa villam or on isolated 
farmsteads, casae, they would owe rents and services to the main 
farm. Although it is only recently that Roman historians have 
begun to elucidate the actual organisation of agricultural and 
craft production on late Roman estates, with archaeological 
evidence becoming ever more important, it is nevertheless clear 
that a division between home farm, or demesne, to borrow a later 
medieval term, and dependent tenures was already in existence 
by the late centuries of the Roman Empire. It was to continue 
throughout the Romano-Germanic period.l3 
ln the formation of a dependent tenant agricultural labour 
force, two processes of social mobility were in evidence. Firstly 
an upward one. Some slaves were freed from gang labour for 
economic considerations and settled as quasi coloni, on tenant 
farms. However, their numbers were probably never large. Slaves 
freed for pious reasons, such as the 8,000 freed by Melania in 
the fourth century, who in all probability must have mostly ended 
up as tenants of one sort or other on the estates on which they 
had laboured as slaves, probably became more numerous, especially 
as Christianity spread. But even they can never have been a major 
consideration.14 The legal status of agricultural slaves gradually 
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came to approximate that of the medieval serf or late Roman 
colonus. From the fourth century, persons registered as slaves 
in the census of Diocletian might not be removed from agricultural 
work. Constantine I allowed them to be sold to other landowners 
in the same province but Valentinian I completely forbade their 
sale without the land they cultivated) 5 Slaves came to be used 
as quasi coloni in the words of the jurists; that is as tenants with 
assigned plots of land. As the conditions of the slaves gradually 
became ameliorated in law and they were allowed to acquire 
property of their own, to bequeath it to their children, and to 
marry free men or women, these changes reflected a general 
disappearance of the gang slave and improvement in the condition 
of slaves in generai.16 
Much more important in this social formation, however, was 
downward social mobility. As Finley has suggested in a most 
provocative manner, the real need for an agricultural and craft 
slave labour force was eroded in the first two centuries of the 
Christian era by the depression of the free Roman population 
into an exploitable class .I 7 This process was reflected in the 
emergence in law of a category of free men known as humiliores, 
as opposed to honestiores, who were subject to legal penalties 
akin to those of slaves. 
Burning alive is usually a punishment for slaves who threaten 
the safety of their masters, but it also applied to plebeians 
and humiles personae. 
and 
In regard to slaves, the rule is that they should be punished 
after the manner of humiliores.l 8 
Rome had always had hierarchically structured bonds between 
the rich and powerful and the poor and weak which had been 
enshrined in law; for example, the relationship beteween patronus 
and free cliens which imposed reciprocal duties including obsequium 
and reverentia on the part of the client, or that between ex-master 
now become patronus and freed slave libertus which came to 
approximate in some ways that between patronus and cliens. In 
both cases the patronus extended his patrocinium, both legal and 
informal protection, to the client or freedman. Such institutions 
dated back to republican times but during the centuries of the 
empire they and other hierarchical relationships multiplied)9 
Precaria possessio was originally a purely contractual 
arrangement similar to lease and hire, locatio conductio rei, which 
it came to supersede as far as agricultural land was concerned.20 
A person requesting, rogans, land from an owner, dominus, acquired 
a protected possession on a long term, which often became 
hereditary. Originally the contract could be terminated at will 
by either party but in the Egyptian papyri precarium is often found 
in connection with patrocinium where freemen had placed 
themselves under the protection of great landlords.21 At the 
back of a law of Valentinian I and Valens of 365 A.D., whose intent 
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was to protect the ultimate ownership by landlords of land held from 
them in precaria possessio, thus indicating that in practice the 
land had often tended to become regarded as the property of the 
precarist, lay a contemporary practice by which the precarist 
was required to pay an annual tax to the landlord.22 What was 
happening was that poor men were approaching landlords asking 
for land to be held ad precem and in return becoming subject 
to their quasi-legal jurisdiction in patrocinium. 
In the early centuries of the empir·e the colonus was a voluntary 
tenant of land, free and free to move when his lease expired. 
but in practise many leases tended to become hereditary. By 
the third centurv coloni on imperial estates in Africa could refer 
to themselves a; born and bred on the estate.23 By a law of 332 
A.D. Constantine tied some coloni to their farms and landlords: 
Any person in whose possession a colonus that belongs to 
another is found not only shall restore the aforesaid colonus 
to his birth status but also shall assume the capitation 
tax for his man for the time that he was with him. 
Coloni also who meditate flight must be bound with chains 
and reduced to a servile condition, so that by virtue of 
their condemnation to slavery, they shall be compelled 
to fulfil the duties that befit freemen.24 
In Constantine's time, this tying of the colonate to its lands was 
by no means universal throughout the empire and, in fact, it was 
extended to Palestine and Egypt onlv in the fifth century and 
was still not universal then in GauJ.2'5 Nevertheless the process 
gradually crept across the empire. A.H.M. Jones has wished to 
_see the imperial decrees which gave effect to it purely and simply 
as part of imperial fiscal policy centred around Diocletian's census 
and his accompanying revision of the poll tax.26 However, most 
scholars see it as enshrining in law processes which were gradually 
becoming common in practice. 
From the fourth and fifth centuries landlords were habitually 
converting free and freed men into coloni tied to the land through 
the process of offering patrocinium. From late fifth-century 
Gaul, the most famous discussion of the process occurs in the 
De gubematione Dei of Salvian of Marseilles, admittedly a writer 
hostile to landlords. Whole villages of impoverished free 
smallholders, he fulminates, were incorporated into the estates 
of large landlords through surrender of their property and freedom 
and receipt of it back subject to patrociniwn as coloni. 
When either they lose their homes and fields to the invaders 
or flee as fugitives from the tax collectors, because they 
cannot hold their land, they seek out the estates of the 
rich and become their coloni.27 
The advantage to the colonus lay in the protection afforded him 
by the patrocinium of the landowners against the depredations 
of tax collectors, other government officials and the vagaries 
of economic circumstances. From fourth-century Egypt a papyrus 
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from the village of Theadelphia illustrates vividly what might 
happen. In 332 A.D. the village had not received its water from 
the Nile for several years because other villages further down 
the canal which carried it had intercepted the water. All but 
three of the twenty-five villagers had disappeared and when the 
tax burden eventually grew too large for the remaining three 
they went looking for their fellow villagers. They found some 
of them living as coloni on the estates of large landowners nearby.28 
Patrocinium lay at the centre of the whole process. It was 
the advantage of protection which the powerful could offer to 
the weak which initiated the process in an era when from the 
end of the Severi (235 A.D.) the agricultural labour-force was 
in turn exposed to the ravages of civil war and then to the excessive 
demands of the government of the dominate from the accession 
of Diocletian (284 A.D.). Although the taxation system was in 
theory fair to all, it was heavy and extremely exposed to corruption. 
Tax assessors were notorious for under-assessing the lands of 
the rich and influential and throwing the burden onto smallholders. 
Large landowners also profited most from the periodic remissions 
of tax arrears because they could keep the tax collector waiting.29 
From 409 A.D. senators of high rank also were exempt from the 
special taxes, extraordinaria and munera sordida, levied periodically 
by the government. 30 And, within the city councils, those large 
landowners who controlled them could usually manage to shift 
the tax burden onto others wlien extraordinaria were imposed 
on their cities. 
From the reign of Constantine onwards a development took 
place which had important consequences. The subordination of 
coloni on estates to regular judicial jurisdiction gave way to a 
system whereby the colonus was tried in the presence of an estate 
official. By a decree of Valentianian I some domains were granted 
immunitas from regular jurisdiction. 31 Judges could not enter 
such domains to exercise compulsion on those living on them. 
The great imperial domains in particular came to enjoy such special 
legal position. Organized under agents, procuratores or actores, 
they were removed from the territoria of the civitates and thus 
from regular administration and justice. Procuratores ·acquired 
quasi magisterial powers, not merely managing the estates but 
also levying taxes, taking action against tenants not performing 
their duties, punishing coloni and exercising military authority 
over them. They had coercitio, the power to compel obedience, 
and cognitio, the right to punish offences.32 Although such 
tendencies appeared first on imperial domains, by the fourth century 
collusion between imperial procuratores and lessees of private 
estates (conductores), or indeed estate owners themselves, led 
to the extention of similar prerogatives to private estates by 
way of patrocinium.33 One of the most famous titles of the 
Theodosian Code was entitled: De patrociniis vicorum.34 In 371 
A.D. it was enacted that landlords or their agents should levy 
the taxes of coloni originales or adscripticii on their estates; that 
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is those coloni whose legal status stemmed from Diocletian's 
census.35 Imperial tax collectors gradually became excluded 
from more and more estates and from the early fifth century 
coloni adscripticii were exempted from military service.36 
The d_epression of the agricultural labour force into the 
dependent status of coloni was by no means a totally unmitigated 
disaster, pace Salvian. The process could never have become 
so widespread had it not offered certain positive benefits in the 
historical circumstances. But nevertheless it had its unattractive 
side. As we saw, in 221 A.D. Constantine allowed landowners 
to chain coloni planning to abscond. In 365 A.D. coloni were 
forbidden to alienate their own property without their landlord's 
consent and in 396 A.D. they were barred from suing their landlords 
for a!,p' reason except for extracting more than the customary 
rent.3 Coloni became increasingly liable to render labour services 
on the home farm or demesne.38 St. John Chrysostom alludes 
to heavy labour services extracted from tenant coloni in the East 
and a Ravenna papyrus indicates that in Italy about one day's 
work a week was demanded.39 As early as the second and third 
centuries it had been necessary to legislate in the Lex Hadriana 
and Lex Manciana against immoderate extension of labour services 
and to fix rents both monetary and in kind.40 In 409 A.D. coloni 
adscripticii were barred from ordination to the priesthood and 
in 452 A.D. from entering monasteries.41 Gradually coloni became 
liable for building and carrying services and for requisitioning 
of transport for imperial goods, officials, or soldiers. In an effort 
to prevent their children becoming free, Justinian enacted that 
coloni adscripticii should not be allowed to marry free men or 
women.42 By the sixth century the maintenance of a hereditary 
class of dependent coloni was of vital concern to government, 
both in the East and in the West. 
By the fourth century at the very latest a seigneurial-patrimonial 
jurisdiction was emerging on the estates of private landlords 
throughout the empire, including Gaul, Spain, Italy and the Rhine 
and Danube provinces. There was an effective foreshadowing 
of future medieval developments. Bucellarii, originally troops 
of barbarian foederati in the service of the state, became used 
as private troops by private landlords. In the hands of great 
landlords they could be used to defy officials of the civil 
administration. By the mid-fifth century, landlords had their 
own private prisons which they used for recalcitrant slaves and 
coloni, enforcing their authority with troops of bucellarii. 43 
Justinian's great general Belisarius began his career in the sixth 
century as a bucellarius of the future emperor. Bucellarii were 
bound to their lords by oath and were equipped, mounted, and 
maintained by him and they could receive landed properties, fundi 
militares, from him. In Visigothic law, the bucellarius was treated 
as one who in patrocinio constitutus est. 44 
The development of the estate towards a semi-autonomous 
social, economic, and judicial institution led to the enactment 
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of sets of estate laws or custumals set apart from the civil law 
and ius gentium of the empire. In Africa such estate laws originated 
on imperial domains as early as the first century, but then spread 
quickly to private estates. The Lex Manciana and Lex Hadriana 
regulated relations between the actual landowners, their 
procuratores or conductores and the labour forces. 45 Dating from 
the reign of Trajan, an inscription from Henshir-Mettich in Tunisia 
mentions the Lex Manciana and records a lex saltus which was 
perhaps a model for other estate custumals. The organization 
of production on each estate varied, of course, but rents in money 
or kind and labour services were paid by the tenants either· to 
the owner, or to a conductor, or else to a bailiff of either. Such 
Mancian tenures and leges saltus were still in existence in the 
fifth century under Vandal rule. 46 
From the second century at the latest an evolutionary process 
throughout the empire saw the importance of large estates become 
enhanced progressively. Through the third, fourth and fifth 
centuries, estates tended to become more and more self-contained 
both economically, socially, judicially and even to some degree 
politically. Consequently, when the Germanic peoples began to 
infiltrate and finally to invade the empire over the course of the 
third, fourth, and fifth centuries they found a system of 
landownership and production with which they could readily identify. 
Ever since the monumental work of Alfons Dopsch, historians 
have accepted that Germanic production systems in the period 
of the Volkerwanderung were characterized as much, if not more, 
by estate production as by peasant freeholding. Writing of the 
Alamanni on the Rhine frontier in the fourth century, Libanius 
says: 
There are great villages belonging to many owners, each 
of whom possesses only a small piece of land; and there 
are other villages which have one lord and are tilled by 
tenants and coloni.47 
In Ostrogothic Italy lands were allocated to the Goths secundum 
dignationem and following the Roman billeting system of 
hospitalitas under which Roman estates were allotted to Goths 
as hospites of their Roman landowner possessores. 48 There is 
no evidence of settlement of Ostrogoths as small peasant 
freeholders and it is significant that amongst the coloni on estates 
Gothic names are found.49 The same pattern appears amongst 
the Visigoths in Southern France, where Gallo-Roman estates 
were divided between possessores and hospites in a ratio of one 
to two. Here again Visigoths were not only landlords with Roman 
cultivators but also cultivators themselves. 50 Landed estates 
were allotted to Visigothic chiefs and nobles by the kings, and 
these then established their own followers as dependent tenants. 
Amongst the Burgundians in what is now modern Savoy the 
Burgundian laws recorded optimates, who ranked with surviving 
Roman nobiles, as well as mediocres and inferiores personae.5I 
In the fourth century Frankish laeti were planted in tribal groups 
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on terrae laeticae set aside by Roman governments for the 
purpose.52 The distribution of lands amongst the Germans, as 
Tacitus tells us as early as the first century, was again made 
sectmdum dignationem and military rank and social position were 
taken into account.53 According to Tacitus, seigneurial estates 
existed amongst the Germans across the Rhine before their 
penetration of the empire, and it is clear from accounts of both 
Roman and Merovingian writers that the Franks settled both in 
communities of peasant freeholders and also on estates under· 
their chiefs or nobles.54 In the Bavarian laws the great estate 
is quite familiar and Bavarian coloni owing services to the lord's 
house are referred to, as well as accolae bound by praedial 
services. 55 
One could elaborate further both in detail and with reference 
to other races, such as the Vandals and Saxons, but it is not 
necessary. The general thesis that the Germans had estate 
landowning and production amongst themselves at the time when 
they were still outside the frontiers and that when they settled 
on the soil of the empire they did so sectmdum dignationem with 
some of them as estate landlords, others as small peasant 
proprietors, and yet others as dependent tenants, usually referred 
to in the sources as coloni, is no longer controversial. Moreover, 
where the Germans settled they did so generally speaking not 
on waste or abandoned land, but rather on sites of Roman 
settlement. In the case of those peoples who settled under the 
hospitalitas system, the land which they received was invariably 
comprised of villa estates of Roman and provincial landowners. 
In the cases of peoples who did not settle under this system, 
archaeological evidence and the study of place names has 
demonstrated beyond doubt that the same process occurred amongst 
the Franks, Saxons, Bavarians, Alammani, and Lombards. 
Both late Roman and also Romano-Germanic society was 
characterised by hierarchical social differentiation and, in both 
cases, large estates in the ownership of rich landlords were an 
important and perhaps predominant feature of the economy. On 
such estates a significant amount of craft manufacture, at least 
of cruder types, increasingly came to be performed as the economic 
functions of towns progressively broke down in the West over 
the course of the fourth and fifth centuries. 
In the succeeding Merovingian period, we find scattered 
throughout the sources for the fifth to eighth centuries a variety 
of words used for the landowning upper classes of society. Generally 
speaking optimates or potentes predominate, but in the Lex Salica 
we find meliores for landowners not actually performing productive 
labour themselves and distinguished from freeholding peasants, 
minofledt.56 Mediani are distinguished from minofledi in the Lex 
Alamannorum and optimates in the Burgundian law from personae 
mediocres and minores.57 In Visigothic law nobiles, potentes, 
and personae honestioris loci are rich landlords distinguished from 
personae viliores and personae inferioris or humilioris loci. 58 
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Such men are in general distinguished from royal officials, who 
very often were not drawn from amongst the landowning classes; 
for example, the agentes in an edict of Clothar of 614 A.D., the 
gasindi and actores of the Lombard king Liutprand, and the Zeudes 
and antrustiones, sworn followers, of the Merovingian kings.59 
No hard and fast distinction can be made between an old landed 
nobility and a new service nobility for the times were far too 
turbulent and characterized by both upward and downward social 
mobility for such lines to have been drawn. Nevertheless, it is 
true that during the first centuries of the Merovingian period, 
ro~ghly 450 to 650 A.D., there was a hereditary landowning class, 
often regarded as an ancient nobility of blood, in whose hands 
large amounts of landed property were held. It formed an 
identifiable interest group viz-a-viz the kings, the royal service 
nobility, warrior retainers, and the various categories of the 
productive labour force. 
In the Merovingian kingdom, throughout its history, a constant 
struggle was maintained by this landowning class against the 
prerogatives of the kings and to accumulate estates at the expense 
of the smallholding peasantry: a struggle in which procedures 
and terminology familiar from the late Roman experience recur 
again and again. 
As in the late Roman period, patronage, patrocinium or 
patronatus, continued to be the catalyst which 'persuaded a 
continuous stream of freemen to surrender their freedom in return 
for protection. Particularly did this become so in the Merovingian 
kingdom once the monarchy began to lose its power and authority 
and internecine warfare among the optimates became endemic.60 
We find the Church complaining about the extension of the estates 
of landlords through the use of patrocinium and being particularly 
worried about ecclesiastics accepting it.61 The Latin patrocinium 
was equated with the German mundeburdum or munt, protective 
authority. In the Formulae Turonenses of the mid-eighth century, 
an actual model for a contract of surrender into patronage, 
mundeburdum, is preserved: 
... I have appealed to your piety and you have willingly 
agreed that I should deliver or commend myself under your 
protection (mundeburdum). This I have done in such a manner 
that you ought to help and console me with both food and 
clothing, according to the degree that I serve you and merit 
from you. And for as long as I remain alive, I must provide 
you service and honour according to my free rank, and 
I shall not have the authority of releasing myself from 
your power and protection at any time in my life. Rather, 
I am to remain under your power and protection all the 
days of my life.62 
Here the man was not to lose his free status, nor was he given 
land to cultivate, or at least the model text does not say so 
explicitly. It may have been intended for warriors rather than 
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peasants. Nevertheless, the principle was the same. In the late 
Roman period the verb used for entering into the patrocinium 
of a landlord had been commendare. The rubric of the formula 
for entering into mundeburdum in the Formulae Turonenses is 
Qui se in alterius potestate commendat,63 
A free man accepting the patrocinium-mundeburdum of another 
thus did not necessarily lose his freedom. He might remain free 
and be able to terminate his patronage relationship at will. 
Alternatively, as in the case above, he might be bound for life. 
But the lower down the socio-economic scale one went, the more 
likely it was that the offer of patronage or protection would be 
conditional upon surrender of freedom and of ancestral lands to 
the lord. Dopsch compiled a collection of quotations from 
Merovingian sources of the sixth century which referred to the 
enslavement or oppression of freemen and the absorption of their 
property both by the royal service nobility and by the landowning 
nobility.64 In the Bavarian laws, the Visigothic Edict of Theodoric, 
the letters of Pope Gregory the Great, and even the Anglo-Saxon 
laws of Ine, attempts were made to protect small freeholders, 
pauperes, miseri, minofledi, and personae minores and viliores, 
from exploitation and in particular from depression to the 
semi-servitude of coloni.65 The Formulae Turonenses also have 
a formula for the actual sale of a person by himself into slavery, 
as also do the Formulae Marculfi and a late seventh-century 
formulary from Anjou: 
... It has pleased me to bind my free status to your service. 
This I have done, and for this I have received from you 
payment, which pleases me, to the amount of so many 
solidi. Therefore from this day forward you have free 
and most firm authority to do with me, your slave, in all 
:~~n~s, what you may wish to do, as with your other slaves 
In most cases the poor man surrendering his freedom would not 
receive its price in cash but rather in land, of which the price 
stated was its value, and except in a few cases where a lord might 
value his services for some other task, he would be settled on 
that land as a servus casatus, a quasi colonus, a "serf" established 
on a tenure and owing rent and labour services to the lord. The 
will of St Bertrand, bishop of Le Mans, of 161 A.D., refers to 
the villa and vicus which he had at Jublains where he had established 
a house, outbuildings, a cowshed, gardens, and colonicae, tenures 
for the coloni.67 This was just one of innumerable estates founded 
in the Merovingian period and worked by families of coloni settled 
on family tenures. 
Just as in the Roman period the great estates acquired 
immunitas from the operation of imperial administration, so also 
did they in the Merovingian period. As the power of the crown 
increased in the early Merovingian period, that of royal officials, 
especially the counts, did also. To counteract this, the great 
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Gallo-Roman and Frankish landowners tried to acquire immunitas 
from the authority of the counts. In 614 A.D. they succeeded 
in coercing Clothar II to promulgate an edict recognizing- the 
immunitas of the optimates-potentates and of the Church.6!f But 
even strong kings such as Clovis, Chilperic I, and Dagobert I had 
earlier recognized the immunities of potentes. The Formulae 
Marculfi include a model for the grant of immunitas by the king 
to a bishop.69 The progressive development of immunities was 
a natural phenomenon whose origins lay back in the Roman period 
and which was intrinsically linked to the socio-economic importance 
of the estate to society. It happened not only in Merovingian 
Gaul but also in Visigothic Spain and was furthered by the institution 
of patrocinium on the estate binding together landowner and peasant 
in a bond of mutual self help and interest viz-a-viz outsiders. 
The immunitas of the estate protected the peasantry from the 
direct encroachment of royal officials because they could not 
enter upon land with immunitas nor exercise force over its 
inhabitants. In law the peasantry of lands with _immunitas were 
represented by agents of the landlord called agentes, advocati 
or defensores. The same thing had also occurred in Roman times 
and in Visigothic Spain the term for such agents was the Roman 
one of assertores.7U All this flowed from the general consequences 
of patrocinium. 
The historical foundations of estate production in medieval 
Europe, what Marx referred to as the Feudal Mode of Production, 
were well and truly established during the Romano-Germanic 
period and, as he so perspicaciously pointed out, the system was 
formed thr·ough an intermingling of earlier Roman and German 
traditions. Production of both agricultural and craft products 
was carried out on large estates owned by non-producing landlords 
by a labour force which, although it was not free, nevertheless 
had property rights in its means of production as servi casati or 
coloni. Transfer of surplus labour or product of labour was effected 
via coercive force which the landowner exercised through his 
private armed retainers and control of the judicial and political 
svstems. All of these characteristics foreshadowed those of the 
l~ter, properly medieval manorialism of post-Carolingian Europe. 
How widespread such production was in the Romano-Germanic 
period and whether it overshadowed free peasant proprietorship 
sufficiently for us to be able to characterize the entire economy 
of the period as a Feudal Mode of Production, as Marx himself 
did, is a different question. 
What is important from the purely semantic perspective is 
that estate production existed on a very large scale centuries 
before the word feudum was ever used. Moreover, the historical 
foundations of the system had nothing whatsoever to do with the 
militarv service of warrior retainers, in return for which lords 
in a l~ter period gave fiefs. In the later Roman Empire most 
villa estates were held by wealthy civilians, although successful 
soldiers also acquired them. But even if soldiers did acquire them, 
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they did not do so essentially through military service and as a 
means of maintaining them in military service in lieu of monetary 
salaries. When the Germans began to settle on the soil of the 
empire they were confronted by landowning systems based on 
landed estates. The settlement of Germanic military comitatus 
was base.d on distribution and division of estates secundum 
dignationem. In the northern and eastern Frankish, Alammanic, 
and Bavarian areas, migrating nobles and war leaders simply settled 
on their own behalf where they could, or, in the days before the 
final collapse of imperial authority, wherever they were allotted 
estates by the imperial government. In the southern and western 
areas of the Ostrogoths, Burgundians, and Visigoths the allotment 
of Roman estates under the hospitalitas system was directed by 
thei!· kings, but the nobles who received the large estates did 
so in their own right as the great men of the race rather than 
in any "feudal" sense of land granted to support a warrior in arms 
and to reward him for service. 
German laeti settled on Roman soil granted to them by the 
imperial government for the duty of service with the Roman armies, 
received lands described as beneficia which could not be alienated 
and were held only for the period of service. These imperial 
beneficia to laeti were direct precursors of those granted by the 
Merovingian kings to their own followers from the mid-sixth century 
onwards. At first Merovingian beneficia were also granted primarily 
for military service, although other forms of service to the crown 
rapidly became rewarded in the same way. In the sixth and seventh 
centuries royal beneficia of estates were granted primarily, though 
not invariably, to the service nobility, the leudes, agentes, 
antrustiones, and especially to the counts, but not generally to 
the hereditary landowning optimates. By extension the term 
beneficia became applied to land grants to non-warriors. Semi-free 
and even unfree men, liable to base services and even described 
as coZoni, received beneficia for the purpose of agricultural 
labour. 71 Many peasant beneficia were granted solely for economic 
reasons by the optimates landowning class. Again, the relationships 
of patrocinium and mundeburdum were bridges which led to the 
institution. From Car·olingian times onwards the beneficium became 
a direct means of transmission to the feudal fief, but even in 
the Merovingian period royal beneficia had many of the 
characteristics of the later feudum given by lord to vassal. The 
essential point is that the properties of which beneficia were 
composed were already working estates complete with all the 
attributes of Marx's Feudal Mode of Production. To take a 
ninth-century example: 
... let it be known to all the faithful of the holy Church 
of God and to our own, present and to come, that one of 
our own faithful subjects, by name Hildebertus, has 
approached our throne and has beseeched our serenity that 
through this command of our authority we grant to him 
for all the days of his life and to his son after him, in right 
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of usufruct and benefice (usufructuario et jure beneficario) 
certain estates which are both called Cavaliacus, in the 
county of Limoges. Giving assent to his prayers for reason 
of his meritorious service, we have ordered this charter 
to be written, through which we grant to him the estates 
already mentioned, in all their entirety, with lands, vineyards, 
forests, meadows, pastures, and with the men living upon 
them, so that, without causing any damage through exchanges 
or diminishing or lessening the land, he for all the days 
of his life and his son after him, as we have said.: may hold 
and possess them in right of benefice and usufruct.'' 2 
The case is exactly the same for the later fief as it was for 
the Merovingian and Carolingian beneficium. It consisted of a 
grant of estates already established and being worked with all 
the characteristics of a Feudal Mode of Production. The gro\yth 
of estate production was a process which originated in natural 
economic forces operating during the later centuries of the Roman 
Empire and during the Romano-Germanic period. The landowner 
who, by exercise of his patronage, succeeded in absorbing the 
independent holdings of free peasants was the critical element 
in the structuring of the system, in laying its historical foundations. 
The Feudal Mode of Production with which we are familiar from 
Marx's work, and manorialism, the same thing, historically had 
nothing whatosever to do with feudalism as a system of granting 
properties to followers in return for military service. To put 
it alternatively, on the one hand a Feudal Mode of Production 
existed and would have continued to exist throughout the Middle 
Ages even if the military fief, the feudum, had never existed. 
On the other hand, the fief could never have existed without a 
pre-existing socio-economic structure of estate production. Marx 
was mindful of this and consequently sought to characterize the 
nature of society and the economy from the Romano-Germanic 
period onwards by a single term. That he chose the word "feudal" 
was perhaps unfortunate for, as I said earlier, it brought with 
it a coterie of implicit assumptions and connotations which merely 
confuse the issue. What Marx meant by Feudal Mode of Production 
was a medieval mode of production. "Feudal" was just shorthand 
for "medieval", and a medieval mode of production was an estate 
mode of production. As such it did indeed have real historical 
foundations and was much more than a mere dialectical antithesis 
of capitalism. 
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